By ARNOLD CHAPLIN, M.D., F.R.C.P.
ABOUT two years ago my attention was drawn to this subject on account of the apparent absence of any reliable data on which a comparison could be based between the mortality in the British Army of the present day and that which took place before the dawn of the era of improved hygienic conditions. Since then my leisure hours have been devoted largely to this subject, and I trust that the results will be found irnteresting enough to be made public.
The labour involved in collecting these statistics will not have been altogether in vain if it be admitted that the exact measure of the advance in sanitary science can hardly be appreciated unless we possess some knowledge of the conditions existing in years long since gone. From the standpoint of history, however, there can be no doubt concerning the importance of this subject, particularly at the present time, for, while to-day our nation is fighting and dying for its existence, it is a satisfaction to know that our forefathers cheerfully submitted to a heavy blood-tax, even in times of peace, in order to acquire and hold this mighty realm.
The literature of this subject is somewhat scanty, and few investigators appear to have been attracted to this question. The first serious attempt at estimating the rate of mortality in the Army was made by Colonel Tulloch and Assistant-Surgeon Balfour in their report to Parliament in 1838. In this admirable report they dealt with the mortality between the years 1816-36, and since they were accomplished F-5 medical men, their work has an added value on account of the light; they throw on the causation of sickness and death. With the exceptions of Sir John Pringle, Sir Gilbert Blane, and Dr. John Davy, Tulloch and Balfour were the first to draw attention to this subject from a statistical standpoint. The only criticism that can be advanced concerning their work is that, in some instances, they offer for comparison the mortality results of two or three years only with those extending over twenty years. But Tulloch and Balfour could never have produced their valuable report had not the material been carefully collected under the able superintendence of the Medical InspectorGeneral of the Army, Sir James McGrigor. Indeed, it is due to him alone that we possess such a complete series of statistics bearing on the mortality in the Army. But even with these bare figures before us, the tale they unfold is, in many respects, surprising. Last July we were told that, as a result of one year's fighting in defence of our liberties, we had to mourn the loss of 60,000 brave men, out of a total of certainly not less than one million engaged, or, in other words, our losses in killed had amounted to 60 per 1,000. I do not, of course, contend that the whole of the million had been exposed to the risk of death in battle for a whole year, but the illustration will serve. Terrible, however, as the slaughter has been, it is not worse than the havoc wrought by disease in the British regiments quartered in various parts of the Empire 100 years ago when no fighting took place. Verily, in a sinister sense, it may be said that "peace hath her victories." This statement, that the rate of mortality of 60 per 1,000 in the present War is not worse than that produced by the ravages by disease a century ago, will not be considered an exaggeration when I state that the average annual death-rate in white troops quartered in Jamaica and, strange as it may seem, the risk of the death of a patient was largely enhanced by removing him to the wretched hovels which did duty as hospitals. Almost invariably the disease took a serious turn, and if death did not ensue from the original complaint, the military hospital contained sufficient infection to implant another fatal disease in its place. In tropical climates soldiers, encumbered by their heavy accoutrements and uniforms, undertook long marches in the burning sun, and at the end of their journey were allowed to slake their thirst with copious draughts of strong ale. The food they consumed was ill-suited to the work they had to perform and the climates in which they lived. At home, typhus fever and small-pox were liable to break out at any time and to decimate a regiment. Chest complaints and venereal diseases were very prevalent, and, from officer down to private, insobriety was rampant. Abroad, in the Tropics, the troops suffered from frequent outbreaks of malaria, plague, yellow fever, and cholera, and for want of proper head-gear sunstroke was common. One has only to read the memoirs and autobiographies of officers and surgeons of those days to understand the terrible havoc made by these diseases.
Having now explained the design of this investigation, and the disadvantageous conditions which wereresponsible for the high deathrate in the Army 100 years ago, attention may be drawn to some of the most important features which come to light from a survey of the mortality in the various quarters of the world in which the troops were stationed. In the first place, however, it will be necessary to establish as an index the rate of mortality in the Army while quartered at home. For this purpose the returns of the troops stationed in Scotland and those of the Foot Guards on service in London have been used. From these two sources of information it is found that the annual rate of mortality from 1817 to 1821 was 15 per 1,000 in the case of troops in Scotland, and 19 per 1,000 in the case of the Foot Guards in London. These figures may be regarded as the two extremes so far as Great Britain is concerned, and no great error will be committed in stating that about 17 soldiers out of every 1,000 quartered in Great-Britain died each year from 1817 to 1821. One would have supposed that this rate of mortality of 17 per' 1,000, occurring in a picked class of men, would compare favourably with that of the rest of the male population of the same ages and subjected to selection. But this is not the case, for Ansell's tables of the mortality among members of the friendly societies during the years 1823 to 1827 show that the mean rate of mortality between the ages of 20 and 40 was 11 per 1,000, a rate very much better than that of the Army.
Having, therefore, established the death-rate in the Army under "home " conditions at 17 per 1,000, we may now consider how that death-rate varied in the diverse climates of the Dependencies of the British Empire. Before proceeding to that subject, however, it may be stated that the death-rate in the Army in Great Britain has fallen from 17 per 1,000 in 1817-21 to 2 6 per 1,000 in 1907-11, a truly wonderful achievement to place to the credit of Public Health. A hundred years ago, in every Colony of the Empire, with the exceptions of Gibraltar, Canada and the Cape, the death-rate in the Army was far higher than in Great Britain, and in some places the price paid in deaths may be described as appalling. But mortality alone was not always the cause of ineffectiveness in the ranks of the Army, for sickness of an incapacitating kind frequently broke out and destroyed its efficiency. A prominent case in point is the well-known and ill-fated Walcheren Expedition of 1809. The medical history of this undertaking, as unfolded in the returns in the Record Office, is probably the most striking illustration extant of the way in which sickness alone may literally " wipe out " an army of considerable size. The whole story of the expedition reads more like a romance than a sober account of mortality and sickness. The Ar*my was away for little more than three months, and comparatively little fighting took place, but the scene of its operations was laid in the swampy Islands of Walcheren and Beveland, in the mouth of the Scheldt. The health of the troops was excellent for a time, but early in September a miasmal fever seized upon the Army and wrought truly appalling havoc. In the middle of September it was decided to reduce the original force of 38,802 men to 16,386, by sending home twenty battalions, but the men composing them were so weak that they were incapable of marching. When, in November, after three months' occupation of this fever-stricken swamp, the poor remnants of the Army were finally withdrawn, 5,671 only could be returned, as effective and fit for marching. It was not death from the bullets of the enemy that caused these terrible ravages, nor was it even deaths from sickness, for during the three months that the Army remained in the mouth of the Scheldt 2,000 only died, though ultimately, of course, the mortality must have been severe. The medical arrangements at the outset were excellent, but disease soon swept off the medical staff, and it was not until Sir James McGrigor took cbarge that fair medical efficiency could. be re-established. Until the present War it was safe to assert that the records of no military undertaking could show a more terrible tale of disaster produced by sickness alone, but now competent authorities aver that Gallipoli will share the doubtful honours with Walcheren.
In India the mortality among the British troops was very high 100 years ago, the mean annual rate being about 87 per 1,000, and it was not until about sixty years ago that an appreciable reduction could be shown in that rate. Since then, however, the rate has steadily diminished, until in the quinquennium 1907-11 it was the surprisingly low one of 6'7 per 1,000. Few facts can attest more strongly the wonderful conquest sanitary science has obtained over the conditions militating against good health in the Tropics. Malaria, plague, cholera, dysentery, and the effects of the sun were responsible for this high deathrate 100 years ago, and although these agencies are still at work, the defence set up by increased knowledge and improved methods has rendered white troops practically immune from their attacks. Indeed, it may now almost be said that dysentery and enteric fever are the only two conditions which have a pronounced effect on the mortality of white troops in the Tropics.
The price paid by the British in blood to acquire, hold, and develop the Indian Empire has been a terribly heavy one; exactly how heavy can probably never be known. Ever since the days when Job Charnock with his handful of followers clambered up the steep mudbank on the Hugli, which was eventually to become Calcutta, the toll of human sacrifice and British life is not to be computed in words. Not only have tens of thousands of British soldiers given their lives, but countless numbers of civilians have met early deaths in the struggle for British supremacy in India. The graves of these heroes, all ignorant of the great part they were playing, are to be found dotted all over the Indian Empire. But for the correct and complete registers of deaths in India kept at the India Office, and a curious and rare book entitled " The Bengal Obituary," published in 1851 by a firm of undertakers in Calcutta, in which the inscriptions found on tombstones are recorded, we should be ignorant of the price Britain has paid. In these records it is astonishing to observe the early age at which mnost of the men died. Promotion and rank had to come to men early if it came at all.
West Africa, and particularly Sierra Leone, was fully entitled to the sinister appellation, " The White Man's Grave," for, 100 years ago, the mortality, even in favourable years, was as high as 362 per 1,000. In the five years from 1907 to 1911 the mortality had fallen to 11 per 1,000, a truly marvellous result, and there are signs that future years will show still further improvement.
The various stations in the West Indies were all more or less unhealthy for British troops quartered there 100 years ago. In the case of Jamaica, the mean annual mortality-rate was the enormous one of 185 per 1,000; while in Bermuda, a comparatively healthy locality, it was 75 per 1,000. The returns for the period 1907-11 show the great improvement that has taken place, for in Jamaica the death-rate was 10 per 1,000 and in Bermuda 3 per 1,000. Throughout the West -Indies yellow fever was very prevalent, and accounted for a considerable number of deaths. In addition, Jamaica manufactured large quantities of rum, and the insobriety of the troops caused much illness. The most unhealthy season of the year in Jamaica was from September to January, and by far the largest number of deaths occurred during that period. The climate of the island also proved to be very deadly to troops newly arrived, and in the case of the 50th Foot, no fewer than 248 died in the first ten months of residence out of a total strength of 513.
Malta was a healthy station when judged by the standards of those days, for the death-rate among the troops was only 25 per 1,000. Canada and Gibraltar showed no variation from the death-rate obtaining in the United Kingdom, and the Cape was able to claim the lowest mortalityrate of all, being only 12 per 1,000.
It will be seen, therefore, that enormous advances have been made during the last 100 years in the science of military hygiene, and while in the past disease swept off far more soldiers than the accident of battle, now our method is so near perfection that death from disease is almost a negligible quantity. A perusal of the two tables which accompany this article will give an idea of the advance that has been.
made.
A COMPARATIVE convinced that with a steady advancement in its sanitation it will become a naturally healthy station, as much as any tropical station is to Europeans. Freetown, as its name suggests, was established as a place of safety to which the slave ships captured by the British Navy were brought, and where the slaves were landed and set free. And it was mainly because of the recurring ,epidemics of yellow fever and the severity of malarial fever owing to the neglect of early treatment, the close proximity as a general rule of the dwellings of Europeans and natives, and the very vague notion then existing as to the means of preventing malaria, that Freetown, usually called Sierra Leone, acquired its evil reputation. It was the same in the West Indies. Yellow fever often prevailed, and created much havoc among our soldiers and sailors, but there, as in Sierra Leone, the sanitation was bad. Many of the barracks were built on sites that were swampy or were near swamps. The cubic space allowed for each soldier was only 250 cubic feet, the latrines were of a primitive kind and not kept very clean, the soldiers' clothes were unsuited to the climate, and it was the same with the food; the soldiers took insufficient exercise, and ate and drank too much. A long time elapsed before it was recognized that European habits of life were not suitable in the Tropics, and especially when, as frequently happened, they were continued in an exaggerated form. The most common of these was excessive drinking, and there are in some of the mortality records in these early days in the East not unfrequently a very candid statement of the cause of death as being due to drink. Most of the causes, however, were attributed to climate. In the old days in Calcutta the dining hour was early in the afternoon, and the meal so sumptuous and prolonged that many a quarrel had its origin then. Again, as regards dress, in old engravings and pictures soldiers will be seen wearing ordinary shakos, with tight red coats and stock collars; and men are to be seen riding in the famous Red Row of Calcutta in high hats and evening dress coats. With a greater appreciation of the necessity of adapting habits and customs to the new environment, the personal hygiene of the European in the Tropics has gradually improved, and probably more rapidly than that of general sanitation in the community. ' In the first two years there was most sickness, and it consisted generally of dysentery, intermittent and remittent fevers, bilious remittent fever with jaundice, jaundice without fever, pleurisies and pneumonias, and influenza, which then was passing in an epidemic over Europe. Pringle noticed that those troops encamped in low ground or quartered in damp barracks with no drains were more unhealthy than those more fortunately situated, and that dysenteries abated so remarkably at times that the change could only be imputed to the troops removing from the infectious privies the foul straw and the filth of a long encampment. He also recognized that when the men were well fed they were healthy. There was only one epidemic of importance in the campaign of 1743, and that was in the village of Feckensheim, which was taken up as a hospital, and where a large number of sick from dysentery were crowded with the wounded from the field of battle. The result was disastrous. Both dysentery and hospital fever acquired such intensity of virulence that patients, apothecaries, nurses, and other attendants of the hospital were attacked, and most of the inhabitants of the village. The hospital lost nearly half of its patients and the inhabitants of the village were almost destroyed. Reading these accounts it appears that much of the mortality in these old campaigns was due to the crowded condition of the hospitals rather than to the condition in the camps, though that also was an important factor. In 1744 and 1745 the Army enjoyed comparatively good health. In the campaign of 1744 the death-rate from sickness did not exceed 15 per 1,000, and in the campaign of 1745 it was only 10 per 1,000. Unfortunately, the death-rate is not given for the first two years.
We 
